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INTRODUCTION
The formation of the United Nations ("U.N.") and the passing of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")' were
important milestones in the contemporary history of human rights.2
However, these developments did not automatically result in
adherence to human rights becoming a requirement of international
legitimacy, participation in international affairs, or, for that matter,
culminate in the empowerment of the world's citizens in any
significant way.3 States steeped themselves in notions of sovereignty
4
and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states,5 and, at
best, recognized the UDHR as a normative tool and an ideal to which
their activities should conform.6 However, the passing of the
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
2. See HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 705 (Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 2000) (reviewing the formation of
international human rights); see also THE FUTURE OF U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
MONITORING 201 (Philip Alston & James Crawford, eds., 2000) (discussing the
United Nations' role in controlling international human rights enforcement); Anne
Gallagher, Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations a Reality: Working with New
Actors and Partners, in THE FUTURE OF U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
MONITORING 201 (Philip Alston & James Crawford, eds., 2000) (expressing that
the effectiveness of the U.N. human rights treaty system rests on "its ability to
encourage and cultivate national implementation of, and compliance with,
international human rights standards").
3. See Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L.
589, 605 (1996) (recognizing that the creation of human standards based on
Western cultural and political notions hindered the concept of universality).
4. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, In Memoriam, 114 HARV. L. REV. 682, 684-86
(2001) (explaining the perception of state sovereignty and how it affects
international relations between nations); see also Anupam Chander, Diaspora
Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1029-30 (2001) (describing the limited powers
states held under the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty).
5. See generally Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399,
1401 (2003) (discussing past and recent issues relating to sovereignty and non-
interference in the context of human rights).
6. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 290
(1996) (arguing that the UDHR remains the primary source of global human rights
standards and is the basis for most human rights instruments).
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")7 and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR")8 marked an important development in the establishment
of legally binding international human rights obligations. Thus, what
was an important political, moral, and normative ideal for states in
the UDHR became a legal and enforceable right in the form of the
ICCPR and, to a certain extent, the ICESCR. 9 These covenants
likewise supplied the early institutions of human rights enforcement
in their human rights committees, the most serious example being the
United Nations Human Rights Committee operating under the
Optional Protocol ° to the ICCPR. 1" Thus, the effort of the human
rights movement, first, expanded the notions of what constitutes
human rights 2 and how states can encourage their enforcement; 3
and second, worked toward the institutionalization of human rights,
7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
8. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
9. See Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1153, 1164 n.53 (1998) (explaining how the
UDHR formed the foundations of human rights law).
10. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Optional Protocol] (establishing a committee
with authority to review alleged human rights violations). See generally STEINER
& ALSTON, supra note 2, at 705-78 (analyzing the functions of the U.N. Human
Rights Committee under the ICCPR Optional Protocol).
11. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudications, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 338-40 (1997)
(explaining how the UNHCR monitors states' adherence to the ICCPR).
12. See Optional Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 1-2 (defining human rights to be
those enumerated in the ICCPR and providing options on ways to remedy
violations of such rights).
13. See Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law
Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1408-16 (1999) (noting how states, non-
governmental organizations, and individuals all play a role in enforcing
international human rights).
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whereby states can enforce activities relating to human rights
through actual practice. 4
While the United Nations toyed with the idea of establishing
national institutions to protect human rights for a long time, the
actual formation of national human rights institutions ("NHRIs") is a
recent phenomenon. 5 Though there are exceptions reflected in the
early development of constitutionalism in the West, NHRIs have
generally emerged out of the international human rights movement. 6
The gradual establishment of NHRIs, however, in some countries of
a region dotted with "guided democracies," along with skepticism
about international human rights law, and universalistic notions of
human rights, provided new challenges and opportunities for
exploring the governance perspectives in institutionalization of
human rights.'7 NHRIs could only make meaningful contribution if
their establishment meets certain standards and principles governing
their existence and performance. 8 The purpose was to create human
rights institutions 9 that would serve as impartial, independent, and
14. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,
111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1977-78 (2002) (observing that countries that have ratified
human rights treaties have better human rights ratings then those countries that
have not).
15. See Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National
Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 2 (2000) (stating that, as of the year 2000, most human
rights institutions were created in the past two or three decades).
16. See generally Report of the Secretary-General on National Institutions for
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 9, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1197/41 (1997)
(explaining the importance of national institutions in the promotion and protection
of human rights).
17. See Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asian Debate, 15
AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1-34 (1994) (analyzing the diverse difficulties human
rights enforcement faces in different countries).
18. See id. at 1 (explaining that there exist "considerable differences among
governments and intellectuals on the understanding, scope and importance of
human rights").
19. See Khalil Z. Shariff, Designing Institutions to Manage Conflict: Principles
for the Problem Solving Organization, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 133, 139-56
(2003) (analyzing the design of institutions that are intended to manage conflict);
see also Michael C. Davis, The Price of Rights: Constitutionalism and East Asian
Economic Development, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 303, 303 (1998) (discussing the
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autonomous entities to enforce national and international human
rights norms. 20  From a practical standpoint, there are valid
justifications for the United Nations and the United Nations Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights to be committed to the
formation of NHRIs21 Because not all human rights violations are of
such magnitude to attract international attention or U.N. human
rights scrutiny, suitably constituted NHRIs could perform these
functions at the national level. 22 Perhaps even states that are over-
zealous in their sovereignty may favor NHRI formation. Thus, there
are significant issues in the concept of NHRIs that deserve deeper
examination.23
This article examines the historical circumstances that have
resulted in the creation of NHRIs.24 Part I will refer to the initiatives
the United Nations took in promoting the institutionalization of
human rights in general. Part II provides a critical analysis of the
standards and principles that underline the U.N. initiatives in setting
connection between the creation of human rights institutions and economic
development).
20. Fact Sheet No.19, National Institution for the Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights at 2, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
[hereinafter Fact Sheet] (indicating the need to create national institutions for
promoting human rights to assist the United Nations in effectively implementing
its goals in this area), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fsl9.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2003),
21. See Brian Burdekin, Human Rights Commissions, in HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSIONS AND OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: NATIONAL EXPERIENCES THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD 801, 807-08 (Kamal Hossain et al. eds., 2000) (listing advantages of
developing national institutions based on human rights instruments).
22. See Sonia Cardenas, Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and
National Human Rights Institutions, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 28 (2003)
(asserting that NHRIs "could serve as local counterparts to international human
rights commissions).
23. See generally ASIA PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, NATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION, REPORT OF THE ALTERNATE
NGO CONSULTATION ON THE SEVENTH ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL WORKSHOP ON
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS] (examining critically the status of institutionalization of human rights in
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Philippines,
and Sri Lanka).
24. See discussion infra Part I (explaining how the United Nations encouraged
states to form NHRIs, and helped establish standards for NHRIs).
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up NHRIs. 25 Part II also critiques the Paris Principles 26 in light of the
contemporary development of human rights discourse. It argues that
the discussion regarding NHRIs should move beyond the Paris
Principles if the independence and effectiveness of NHRIs are to be
ensured.
Part III analyzes the general impact of NHRIs in influencing
human rights policies .2 This section provides an evaluation of social
expectations created by NIHRIs and how states have fulfilled those
expectations. It argues that NHRIs could provide meaningful
relevance to the human rights movement only if countries
continuously challenge, and in this process improve, their legitimacy
and functional effectiveness. It further argues that this would provide
the much-needed transparency and accountability of NHRIs that
would provide them validity as credible partners in the struggles
relating to the protection and promotion of human rights.
Part IV examines the general functions of NHRIs to understand
the purpose of the institutionalization of human rights.28 This section
includes an analysis of the unique features of NHRIs as opposed to
other prevailing institutions whose functions overlap with these
NHRIs. 29 The article will also analyze NHRIs' role and functions in
promoting good governance policies and in transforming the
development agenda in the states through the international law of
development,30 with a view to mainstreaming human rights in all
activities of public administration."
25. See discussion infra Part I (discussing the Paris Principles and its strengths
and weaknesses in setting forth guidelines for NHRIs).
26. See G.A. Res. 134, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134
(1993) [hereinafter Paris Principles] (establishing the powers of national
institutions for "the promotion and protection of human rights").
27. See discussion infra Part III (analyzing the relationship between social
expectations and NHRI effectiveness).
28. See discussion infra Part IV (defining the role of NHRIs in governmental
institutions).
29. See discussion infra Part V (relating the importance of NHRIs working
with other institutions to further the protection of economic, social, and cultural
rights).
30. See James C.N. Paul, The United Nations and the Creation of an
International Law of Development, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 311 (1995)
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Lastly, this article concludes that NHRIs are extremely important
and very useful institutions founded on the basis of objectives that
are profoundly significant for institutionalization of human rights.32
Moreover, the article argues that with the work of NHRIs,
international human rights norms can be enforced effectively 33 within
state boundaries, particularly when the legal and constitutional
frameworks existing in the states supplement them.34 It is here that
NHRIs play a pivotal role.
However, it is important for the United Nations and others who
believe in the institutionalization of human rights to understand that
NHRIs are indeed double-edged swords. If properly used, NHRIs
can play an important role in engaging with governments to make
them appreciate the need to conform their actions to national and
international human rights norms, provide democratic forums for
empowering citizens, and ensure that justice is done to the victims of
human rights violations by allowing them to feel that their concerns
are heard.35 However, NHRIs could also be political tools in the
hands of oppressive and authoritarian regimes to legitimize the
(explaining how the international law of development stresses that development be
"people-centered" and respectful of human rights).
31. See discussion infra Parts VI-VIT (emphasizing how NHRls can work with
a state's judiciary and the civil society in reaching the goals of protecting and
promoting human rights).
32. See infra notes 237-243 and accompanying text (concluding that, although
NHRIs have structural weaknesses, they are useful institutions that can further
protect human rights within states).
33. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing
Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 183-85 (2002) (describing
the obstacles that make human rights institutions unenforceable).
34. See Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law, of Human Rights?:
Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 499, 499-501 (2000) (relating how legal frameworks and judicial
enforcement of constitutional rights have contributed to the growth of international
human rights).
35. See infra notes 151-158 and accompanying text (discussing how NHRIs
can aid in bringing human rights to the mainstream and into the concept of "good
governance" by protecting human rights locally and accepting and enforcing
human rights norms on the international level).
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human rights violations that have and are being committed.36 All of
these are genuine concerns that one must keep in mind while
advocating the formation of NHRIs.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
In 1946, the United Nations Economic and Social Council
("ECOSOC") asked Member States to consider the "desirability of
establishing information groups or local human rights committees
within their respective countries to collaborate with them in
furthering the work of the Commission on Human Rights."37 In 1960,
the ECOSOC passed a resolution recognizing the distinctive "role
national institutions could play in the protection and promotion of
human rights" and "invited governments to encourage the formation
and continuation" of NHRIs.3 8 Discussions continued as to what kind
of assistance NHRIs would provide for effective implementation of
international human rights standards. 39 The Commission on Human
Rights followed this by organizing a seminar in Geneva in
September 1978, where a set of guidelines evolved as to what
functions NHRIs could discharge.40 The Commission on Human
Rights and the U.N. General Assembly later endorsed these
guidelines.41 The United Nations began to involve itself actively and
seriously in the project of establishing NHRIs from as early as the
36. See infra notes 126-128 and accompanying text (implying that
governments with little respect for human rights would establish NHRIs to appear
legitimately concerned with human rights protection).
37. Fact Sheet, supra note 20, at 2.
38. Id. (discussing the Economic and Social Council's resolution establishing
human rights committees).
39. See id. at 3 (describing possible guidelines and functions of national
institutions).
40. See id. (explaining that the guidelines included six functions of NHRIs,
including acting as a source of human rights information, educating the public on
human rights, making recommendations as to human rights in a particular state,
advising the government on human rights matters, studying and reporting on a
state's legislation and judicial decisions regarding human rights, and performing
any other function the government may wish in connection to the state's duties
under international human rights agreements).
41. See id. at 4 (noting that when the Commission endorsed the guidelines, they
also asked that all Member States take steps to establish NHRIs).
[19:259
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1980s when the U.N. Secretary General began preparing a series of
reports on the subject and presented them to the U.N. General
Assembly.4 2 The efforts of the United Nations culminated in the
42. E.g., Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United
Nations System For Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms: National Institutions For the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess.,
Agenda Item 79(b), U.N. Doc. A/36/440 (1981); Alternative Approaches and Ways
and Means Within the United Nations System For Improving the Effective
Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: National Institutions
For the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Agenda Item 100, U.N. Doc. A/38/416 (1983);
Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the
Commission; Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United
Nations System For Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms: National Institutions For the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, 43d Sess., Agenda Item II of the Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1987/37 (1987); Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and
Methods of Work of the Commission; Alternative Approaches and Ways and
Means Within the United Nations System For Improving the Effective Enjoyment of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: National Institutions For the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Updated Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 11 of the
Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/1989/47 (1989); Further Promotion and
Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the
Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission; Alternative
Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System For
Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms:
National Institutions For the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Updated
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 45th Sess.,
Agenda Item 11 of the Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/1989/47/Add. 1
(1989); Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of
Work of the Commission; Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the
United Nations System For Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms: National Institutions For the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights: Updated Report Prepared By the Secretary-General,
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 11 of the
Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/23 (1991); Further Promotion and
Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the
Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission; Alternative
Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System For
Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms:
National Institutions For the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Updated
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Commission on Human Rights organizing a workshop in 1990 with
the participation of national and regional institutions.43 The purpose
of the workshop was to review patterns of cooperation between
national and international institutions and to examine the factors that
could result in improving the effectiveness of NHRIs." The
conclusions of this important workshop came to be known as the
"Paris Principles" of 199 1.1
The Paris Principles provide enormous guidance and direction on
the formation of NHRIs in general, and also about the standards and
principles that NHRIs must follow in order to function effectively.46
In 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (adopted
at the end of the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights) stated
that NHRIs play an important role in promoting and protecting
human rights, disseminating human rights information, and
providing education about human rights.4 7 It is interesting that the
enthusiasm to form NHRIs has largely been positive in different
regions of the world.4 The United Nations has been keen to establish
Report Prepared By the Secretary-General.: Addendum, U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 11(a) &(b), U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1991/23/Add.1 (1991).
43. See Fact Sheet, supra note 20, at 4 (describing how the creation of many
new international institutions brought about the workshop).
44. See id. (asserting that the purpose of the workshop was to review patterns
of cooperation between national institutions such as the United Nations and its
agencies).
45. See id. at Annex (describing the functions of NHRIs).
46. See Paris Principles, supra note 26 (discussing how the Paris Principles
relate to the status of national institutions).
47. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR World
Conference on Human Rights, 23d Sess., 157th mtg. 83-98, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 (1993) (noting the additional importance of NHRIs in advising
authorities and in remedying human rights violations).
48. See Philip Eldridge, Emerging Roles of National Human Rights Institutions
in Southeast Asia, 14 PACIFICA REV. 209, 215-21 (2002) (analyzing the workings
of NHRIs in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia); see also Human
Rights Watch, Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa, Protectors or
Pretenders? Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa (2001) [hereinafter
Protectors or Pretenders?] (finding that the number of countries with NHRIs has
increased significantly between 1989 and 2000), at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2OOl/africa/overview/summary.html (last visited Oct.
11, 2003).
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a regional human rights framework 49 in the East Asian region 0
similar to established bodies such as the Council of Europe, the
Organization of American States, and the Organization of African
Unity." However, there was neither consensus nor enthusiasm from
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation on this issue.52 The grounds for opposition in
Southeast Asia53 to the creation of regional human rights mechanisms
ranged from the much-discussed "Asian values" argument 4 to
hesitation about compromising national sovereignty.5
49. See Daniel Bell, The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections
on an East West Dialogue, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 641, 655 (1996) (citing the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other U.N. documents as standards for
promoting human rights in East Asia), available at
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/human-rights-quarterly/vO18/18.3bell.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2003).
50. See Li-ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries:
"Promises to Keep and Miles to Go Before I Sleep ", 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.
L.J. 1, 25-29 (1999) (discussing the problems and prospects of developing human
rights regime and institutions in East Asian countries).
51. See id. at 6 (stating that East Asia does not have the same political
infrastructure of these organizations, which may limit East Asia in working with
them).
52. See id. at 5-6 (commenting on the lack on consensus within Asia on human
rights norms).
53. See Yash Ghai, Human Rights in the Asian Context: Rights, Duties and
Responsibilities, in ASIAN VALUES: AN ENCOUNTER WITH DIVERSITY 20, 20-38
(1998) (discussing the challenge to the emphasis on human rights asserted by East
and Southeast Asian countries).
54. See Yash Ghai, Asian Perspectives on Human Rights, 23 H.K. L.J. 342,
342-43 (1993) (noting that the theory of one Asian view of human rights is based
on the theory that "human rights as propounded in the West are founded on
individualism and therefore have no relevance to Asia, which is based on the
primacy of the community"); see also Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and
Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 109, 111-114 (1998) (outlining the political and scholarly debate of
"Asian values" and what they may encompass, e.g., authoritarianism).
55. See Ghai, supra note 54, at 344(asserting that the pressure from Western
states for improved human rights "is connected with the project of Western global
hegemony").
2003] 269
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II. THE PARIS PRINCIPLES
Today we must re-examine the Paris Principles since they not only
affect our understanding of the institutionalization of human rights in
specific countries, but also have an impact on the formation of
institutions that achieve the goals of protecting and promoting human
rights.56 It is important, therefore, to question the very rationale of
the formation of NHRIs. Any discussion that begins its analysis and
understanding of NHRIs from the U.N. initiatives or the Paris
Principles perspective presupposes that these institutions are
inherently good. 7 For this reason, much of the academic writing on
this subject has been largely an evaluation of the working of NHRIs
based on national and international standards. 8 While the assessment
of the working of particular NHRIs is quite helpful, it is important to
move beyond that evaluation. 9 This suggestion is not to say that the
U.N. initiatives, the Paris Principles, and national and international
standards are in any way inferior or irrelevant for examination, but it
56. See Paris Principles, supra note 26 (explaining the powers and formation of
national institutions that work in the international human rights field).
57. See Bell, supra note 49, at 656 (questioning the value of U.N. documents as
the basis of promoting human rights in Southeast Asia).
58. See Amanda Whiting, Situating Suhakam: Human Rights Debates and
Malaysia's National Human Rights Commission, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 59, 72-74
(2003) (using the U.N. initiatives and Paris Principles as a basis for discussing
human rights in Malaysia); see also Vijayashri Sripati, India's National Human
Rights Commission: A Shackled Commission?, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 4-6 (2000)
(evaluating the success of the U.N. ideals and Paris Principles in India); Stephen
Livingstone, The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, 22 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1465, 1468-69 (1999) (discussing the Paris Principles and the U.N. guidelines
as the basis for creating NHRIs in Northern Ireland). See generally Mario Gomez,
Sri Lanka's New Human Rights Commission, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 281, 282-83 (1998)
(assessing positively the value of the U.N. proposals and the Paris Principles);
Sonia Cardenas, National Human Rights Commissions in Asia, 4 HuM. RTS. REV.
30, 31-32 (2002) (evaluating international human rights against state sovereignty);
Sidney Jones, Regional Institutions for Protecting Human Rights in Asia, 50
AUSTL. J. INT'L AFF. 269, 269-70 (1996) (remarking on the effectiveness of
international commissions on the regional level); National Human Rights
Commission for Japan, UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE: HUM. RTS. NEWSL. FROM JAPANESE
Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (JCLU Universal Principle, Tokyo, Japan), Winter 2002, at
3-10 (commenting on the National Human Rights Commission for Japan and
evaluating its role and purpose in the country).
59. See Cardenas, supra note 58, at 32 (noting that human rights commissions
working impact is not entirely clear).
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underlines the importance of questioning the existence of institutions
like NHRIs.6 ° It would help us to understand the importance, or
otherwise, of this institution as well as to examine better its function,
not just with reference to some predetermined set of principles and
standards, but with particular emphasis on the context and
circumstances surrounding the establishment of these institutions.
61
The Paris Principles are the first systematic effort to enumerate the
role and functions of NHRIs. 62 They are divided into sections
comprising certain headings: competence and responsibilities,
composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, methods
of operation, and additional principles concerning the status of
commissions with quasi-jurisdictional competence. 63 Efforts have
been made to ensure that NHRIs have "as broad a mandate as
possible"'  and that such mandate has either constitutional or
legislative validity.65  The comprehensive section on NHRIs'
competence and responsibilities has given the institutions sufficient
scope to evolve according to socio-legal and political circumstances,
and to include those functions that they deem appropriate.
66
However, the section on the composition and guarantees of
independence and pluralism fails to underline the need for measures
to ensure the NHRIs' independence and institutional autonomy.67
While drafting the Paris Principles, there was an opportunity to
emphasize the philosophy underlying the establishment of these
institutions, which is to ensure the protection and promotion of
60. See, e.g., id. (questioning the value of international commissions on the
domestic level).
61. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 58, at 269 (implying that it is important to
consider Asia on the sub-regional level when it comes to human rights because of
the variation in countries' political and cultural definitions).
62. See Paris Principles, supra note 26 (outlining the responsibilities of NHRIs
in the national context).
63. See id. (categorizing the status of national institutions).
64. Id. (noting the competence and responsibilities of national institutions).
65. See id. (stating that the national institution shall clearly establish its
mandate in either a constitutional or a legislative text).
66. See id. (allowing for flexibility in the composition of national human rights
institutions).
67. See id. (establishing that NHRIs may represent the pluralism of social
forces of civilian society).
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human rights and fundamental freedoms of people through the
development of national institutions, 6 however, states may have
already mandated this task to other institutions, particularly the
judiciary and, to a certain extent, the administrative methods of
grievance redress mechanisms within the government departments.69
"Guarantees of independence and pluralism,"70 even though
mentioned in the sub-heading of the Paris Principles, offer very little
guidance to the states as to how to achieve this independence.71 The
Paris Principles emphasize the need to ensure adequate funding for
the NHRIs.72 The Report of the Alternate NGO Consultation on the
Seventh Asia-Pacific Regional Workshop on National Human Rights
Institution, however, has pointed out inadequacies in the Paris
Principles.73 As part of the responsibilities of NHRIs, the Paris
Principles observe that the NHRIs should "promote and ensure the
harmonization of national legislation regulations and practices with
the international human rights instruments to which the State is a
party, and ensure their effective implementation."74 While this is an
important principle in as much as it refers to the compatibility of
international human rights law and national legislation, the principles
should also ensure that governments take efforts to ratify
68. See Paris Principles, supra note 26 ("Emphasizing the importance of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human
Rights and other international instruments for promoting respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.").
69. See id. (recognizing and affirming that "priority should be accorded to the
development of appropriate arrangements at the national level").
70. Id.
71. See id. (allowing NHRIs to establish their composition by "a procedure
which affords all necessary guarantees" but not outlining what that procedure may
entail, or how independent it must be).
72. See id. (providing that the purpose of providing adequate funding for a
national institution is to ensure the institution has its own staff and premises).
73. See generally NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 3-8 (noting that,
among other shortcomings, the Paris Principles are "not sufficiently clear
regarding the 'quasi-jurisdictional competence' of NHRIs" and are silent on the
powers of certain NHRIs).
74. Paris Principles, supra note 26.
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international human rights treaties." The NHRIs are not the only
institutions that have the task of ensuring compliance with treaty
obligations; 76 the Governments' law ministry could perform these
tasks while the NHRIs would then supplement the role of the other
governmental departments, and to a certain extent the judiciary, in
ensuring treaty compliance.
77
Setting standards in the area of human rights, ensuring treaty
ratification, and promoting domestic law reform to elevate the status
of international human rights treaties within the domestic law are
important aspects of improved governance mechanisms in human
rights matters that NHRIs ought to be performing. 78 This assumes
significance in light of expanding notions of human rights and the
continuous and specialized development of international human
rights jurisprudence. 79 The Copenhagen Declaration correctly
summarizes this aspect when it emphasizes the need for NHRIs to
ensure that "governments ratify international human rights treaties,
remove reservations contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty
and ensure consistency between domestic laws, programs and
policies and international human rights standards."80 The Paris
75. See id. (stating that a NHRI shall "encourage ratification of [international
human rights] instruments or accession to those instruments, and.., ensure their
implementation").
76. See David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 879, 881 (2003) (discussing further issues on human rights
compliance in the context of signaling theory).
77. See id. at 909 (declaring that courts and other government bodies should
cite to human rights instruments in making decisions or legislating in order to
show support for treaty compliance).
78. See The Copenhagen Declaration, U.N. OHCHR, 6th Conf., Sixth
International Conference for National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights (2002) (reaffirming the importance of international human rights
treaties, implementing declarations, and adopting policies on the domestic level),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/copendec.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2003).
79. See, e.g., Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a
Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121, 121 (2001) (citing the United States as an
example of a country that must reconsider its domestic policies and sovereignty in
light of international human rights law).
80. The Copenhagen Declaration, supra note 78 (affirming that all people are
entitled to human rights and liberties set forth in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights).
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Principles do not give sufficient guidance regarding how the
proposed function of NHRIs would have quasi-jurisdictional
competence, which demonstrates an inherent weakness in the
formulation of principles.8 While the Paris Principles laid out the
foundational objectives and operational functions of NHRIs, the
Principles fail to provide a legal basis for the autonomous existence
of the NHRIs, the standards for achievement, and the measures to
ensure the effectiveness of the recommendations made by the
NHRIs. s2
Another factor demonstrating that the Paris Principles should have
a stronger construction, with a view to ensure the independence and
effectiveness of NHRIs, is the fact that the Paris Principles do not
have a legal basis to which states may adhere." Ensuring quasi-
jurisdictional competence is a welcome measure in the Principles,
but there are no operational guidelines for the NHRIs' powers that
will assure this competence.84 Nevertheless, some of the NHRIs have
indeed provided for such powers, as does the National Human Rights
Commission of India ("Indian NHRC").85 For example, the
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 has provided the Indian
NHRC16 with the powers of a civil court,17particularly with respect to
81. See Paris Principles, supra note 26 (relating that a national institution "may
be authorized to hear and consider complaints and petitions" without explaining
how the institution would achieve this quasi-jurisdictional power).
82. See id. (describing how the national institution should be independent in
choosing its composition but without describing how it could be legally
independent).
83. See id. (laying out the responsibilities that the national institution should
exercise within a state).
84. See id. (indicating only the duties of NHRIs that have quasi-jurisdictional
competence).
85. See Charles Norchi, The National Human Rights Commission of India as a
Value-Creating Institution, in HUMAN RIGHTS: POSITIVE POLICIES IN ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC RIM 113, 127 (John D. Montgomery, ed., 1998) (detailing the positive
aspects of India's NHRC and its effectiveness in community decisions). See
generally SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, JUDGMENT
RESERVED: THE CASE OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF INDIA,
(2001) (providing a working assessment of the Indian NHRC).
86. See T.K. Thommen, Human Rights Commission, 17 COCHIN UNIV. L. REV.
1, 4-5 (1993) (discussing the foundational objectives of the Indian NHRC). See
generally V. Vijayakumar, The Working of the National Human Rights
Commission: A Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDIA: HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND
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summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining
them on oath, discovery and production of any documents, receiving
evidence on affidavit, requisitioning any public record or copy
thereof from any court or office, and issuing commissions for the
examination of witnesses or documents and also any other matter
that may be prescribed.88 States should protect the powers of NHRIs,
which the states could best achieve if they enact NHRIs through
legislation or, alternatively, by constitutional sanctity.8 9 Thus, the
Paris Principles are, at best, a good starting point for discussions
relating to the formation of NHRIs, but it is not in the human rights
movement's best interest to give them more importance than they
deserve in light of their weaknesses and limited nature. 9 The
discussion regarding NHRIs must move beyond these principles so
that U.N. human rights agencies and all others concerned with the
objective of promoting NHRIs can expand the scope of the
principles. Institutional autonomy and effective enforcement of
human rights through statutorily given powers are the only ways by
which NHRIs can avoid impunity relating to human rights violations.
III. IMPACT OF NHRIS - SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS
AND UNFULFILLED PROMISES
The formation of NHRIs undoubtedly marks the hope for a
possible avenue to address human rights concerns domestically.91
The nature of the language of human rights, due to its empowering
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 211, 217 (Chiranjivi J. Nirmal, ed., 1999) (describing the
establishment of the Indian NHRC).
87. See generally Vijayakumar, supra note 86, at 217-20 (analyzing the
working of the Indian NHRC and noting its similarities with the court system).
88. See NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 5 (noting some specific
powers given to some NHRIs).
89. See Paris Principles, supra note 26, at Annex 2 (providing that NHRIs
"shall be given a mandate as broad as possible, which shall clearly be set forth in a
constitutional or legislative text").
90. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text (analyzing the weaknesses of
the Paris Principles in delineating the powers and duties of NHRIs).
91. See, e.g., Yash Ghai, Universalism and Relativism: Human Rights as a
Framework for Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 CARDoZO L. REV. 1095, 1099
(2000) (discussing the incorporation of international human rights in the
constitutions of India, Canada, South Africa, and Fiji).
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tone and the granting of rights to individuals (and at times, groups),
creates legitimate social expectations.92 Regardless of the human
rights record of the government that created the NHRI, many
countries have social expectations regarding what protections NHRIs
can deliver. 93 It is possible that social expectations could change for
the better or for the worse after the NHRIs have started to function. 4
Moreover, the levels of social expectations would vary depending
upon numerous factors, including the rule of law that prevails in a
certain society; the effectiveness of other institutions that are already
in place; the nature of the particular government (democratic or
autocratic); the nature of the legal system and the existing guarantees
relating to rights and freedoms in the Constitution, bill of rights, or
other legislation; the freedom of the press; the role of non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs"); and the extent of "civil
society"95 participation in public affairs.96 NHRIs in many respects
shape and express the human rights policies of states. 97 Cardenas,
while commenting on the inability of NHRIs to fulfill the social
expectations they help to generate, has correctly observed that, "if
NHRIs are not independent, representative, and organizationally
92. See Cassel, supra note 79, at 126-35 (criticizing the effectiveness and the
roles of international human rights law on human rights protection); see also David
Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem? 15
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 101, 116-17 (2002) (asserting that human rights "promises
more than it can deliver").
93. See generally UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 119-20
(Oxford University Press 2002) (describing human rights movements as social
movements).
94. See Cassel, supra note 79, at 135 (asserting that international human rights
law may be more effective in the future after collaborating with different
institutions); see also Kennedy, supra note 92, at 102-06 (questioning the role of
the human rights movement by weighing the costs and benefits derived in different
circumstances).
95. See Tom G. Palmer, Civil Society No Longer Means What it was Supposed
to Mean, J. CIV. SOC'Y, 6, 12 (June-July 1997) (discussing traditional and
modem definitions of civil society), at
http://www.civnet.org/journal/journal_frameset.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).
96. See Ghai, supra note 91, at 1103-04 (citing examples of different countries'
social expectations and how they vary according to the governing rule of law,
institutions, constitutions, and cultures).
97. See Paris Principles, supra note 26 (dictating how states should incorporate
national institutions).
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powerful, they could be more adept at promoting rather than
protecting human rights norms."98 NHRIs shape states' human rights
policies independently of the fulfillment of social expectations or, for
that matter, the unfulfilled promises for victims of human rights
violations.99 Human rights work by NHRIs, governments, judiciaries,
NGOs, and civil society is a continuously evolving activity. 100 The
purpose of human rights activism is to ensure that there is, at first,
recognition of a human rights violation, and secondly, that justice is
done to the victims. 0 1 When societies recognize human rights and
formulate legal, judicial, and institutional frameworks to protect and
promote human rights, they commit to ensure that states provide the
victims of human rights violations with justice."0 2 NHRIs then
become defenders of human rights, not just against the state and its
apparatus, but also against the practices and the system that does not
guarantee adequate protection and promotion of human rights.1
0 3
Hitherto, states were involved in formulating policies relating to
human rights in the form of passing laws, rules, and regulations
designed to protect human rights. 04 With the arrival of NHRls in the
governance framework, however, the institutional approach of
98. Cardenas, supra note 22, at 38.
99. See Reif, supra note 15, at 10-11 (discussing the implementation of NHRIs
in social policy without regard to social expectations); see also Protectors or
Pretenders?, supra note 48 (describing how governments can implement NHRIs to
protect human rights, and thus limit a NHRIs power to act as much as the
governments like).
100. See Cassel, supra note 79, at 134-35 (detailing the evolution of human
rights law and institutions).
101. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 47, pmbl.
(noting that human rights derive from the human person and the support of human
dignity and worth); see also Cassel, supra note 79, at 124-25 (discussing the
connection between fundamental rights of all people and enforcement of those
rights through international human rights law).
102. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 47, 1
("Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings;
their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of Governments.").
103. See Paris Principles, supra note 26 (outlining purposes of NHRIs in and
beyond their role in the government).
104. See, e.g., Reif, supra note 15, at 1 (relying on state regulation and law
making as a way to protect and promote human rights).
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protecting human rights1 15 has been strengthened by empowering
NHRIs to intervene in state and agency matters that result in human
rights violations.10
6
However, NHRls generate a certain degree of expectation because
of their institutional structure and political context, given that they
happen to be the only state-formed agency whose agenda is
exclusively to protect and promote human rights.10 7 While the
judiciary is indeed performing similar tasks, and has been performing
this role reasonably well in most jurisdictions, NHRIs have come to
supplement the role of other democratic institutions in ensuring that
issues of human rights remain the central focus of political discourse
in every society.108 By bringing human rights to every society's
political discourse, NHRIs are engaged in the process of empowering
individuals and institutions.109 NHRIs empower individuals to
recognize that they do not have to tolerate human rights violations
and that there is no reason for victims to suffer silently against
violations committed by the state and its agencies. 10 NHRIs also
empower institutions because they can potentially influence the
policies and practices of other institutions of governance. 1
105. See Thio, supra note 50, at 60-62 (discussing the value of institutions that
protect human rights on an independent national level).
106. See Paris Principles, supra note 26 (giving NHRIs a role in national
governments).
107. See Reif, supra note 15, at 10 ("The human rights commission has as its
express mandate the protection and promotion of human rights.").
108. See Protectors or Pretenders?, supra note 48, at 2 (stating that national
legislation, an independent judiciary, the establishment of democratic institutions,
and human rights commissions are ways to protect human rights on the national
level).
109. See Thio, supra note 50, at 62-63 (arguing that institutions have more
power through cooperation with NGOs and other national institutions, which in
turn empowers individuals); see also Davis, supra note 54, at 132 (discussing
empowerment in the context of constitutionalism).
110. See, e.g., Vijayakumar, supra note 86, at 224 (noting the number of cases
initiated in India after the creation of the National Human Rights Commission).
These statistics suggest that more individuals are willing to bring claims of human
rights violations given the structure of the Commission was then in place. Id.
111. See Paris Principles, supra note 26 (giving NHRIs influence in legislative
processes and governmental institutions).
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Moreover, developing a culture of human rights can enhance the
social expectations generated by NHRIs. 112 NHRIs create a sense of
awareness among civil society by promoting human rights education
and a sense of awareness of people's rights. "3 Numerous experiences
from different countries demonstrate that NHRIs engage in the
process of sensitizing people in human rights related issues by a
variety of methods, including knowledge and capacity building
initiatives." 4 These initiatives need to begin at the local and
community level so that people may understand that human rights
are not empty words with little enforcement value, but rather a
powerful tool to ensure the legal protection of human dignity."
5
NHRIs can most effectively perform this function by focusing on the
laws, constitution, and bill of rights provisions in the domestic legal
framework." 6 In addition, the development of international human
rights law has shaped the policies and practices of governments and
institutions in various countries, and gradually the domestic
protection of human rights is fulfilling the standards that
international human rights law guarantees."' This interplay between
the domestic structure for the protection of human rights and the
international framework of human rights protection is important for
the human rights movement." Is
112. See Protectors or Pretenders?, supra note 48 (articulating the ways in
which NHRIs create positive social expectations).
113. See id. (asserting that a national human rights commission raises awareness
and activism regarding human rights).
114. See Whiting, supra note 58, at 73-77 (discussing human rights initiatives in
Malaysia); see also Sripati, supra note 58, at 4-6 (analyzing the human rights
commission in India). See generally Livingstone, supra note 58, at 1468-69
(commenting on the presence of a human rights commission in Northern Ireland).
115. See Ghai, supra note 91, at 1135 (discussing the legitimization of human
rights on the domestic level when these rights comply with cultural and societal
norms).
116. See Paris Principles, supra note 26, at 4 (stating that national institutions
should have their goals clearly outlined in a constitutional or legislative text).
117. See, e.g., Ghai, supra note 91, at 1135-40 (evaluating examples of human
rights policies in India, Canada, South Africa, and Fiji).
118. See Cardenas, supra note 58, at 31-32 (discussing the tension between state
sovereignty and human rights); see also BAXI, supra note 93, at 119-21 (analyzing
the human fights movements over time).
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NHRIs rest upon a particular form of public legitimacy;" 9 a belief
that their functioning in a given society can fulfill certain social
expectations.12 0 This legitimacy would seriously come into question
if NHRls were not effective in their performance.' 2' NHRIs have to
overcome the inherent legitimacy challenge to their existence given
that they are part of the government. 22 But, as the Human Rights
Watch rightly observed in its report on National Human Rights
Commissions in Africa,1 23 "[e]ven in the most repressive regimes, the
establishment of an official state body devoted to human rights may,
on occasion, create an official space for a human rights discourse and
may foster greater, even if limited, activism and awareness.' 24 While
it is accepted that sensitization of human rights is an important
outcome of NHR~s and it is possible that NHRIs may cause human
rights issues to come to the forefront of governance, NHRIs can only
test their institutional legitimacy through their performance and, in
particular, their impact on rendering justice to those who fall victim
to human rights violations.'25 The Human Rights Watch Report
observed that one should not confuse the creation of NHRIs with a
government's greater respect for human rights.2 6 It may well be that
governments with poor human rights records establish NHRIs to
119. See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The Global Process of Legitimation and the
Legitimacy of Global Governance, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 127-28
(1997) (explaining that maintaining a system of global governance depends on
legitimizing international rules and institutional processes).
120. See Cassel, supra note 79, at 121-22 (supporting the ideal that human rights
institutions and international law work together to fulfill societal expectations).
121. See Okafor, supra note 119, at 133 (discussing the need to enhance the
legitimacy of institutions to avoid "institutional ills and undesirable outcomes").
122. See Protectors or Pretenders?, supra note 48 (stating that it is both a
strength and a weakness of national human rights commissions that they are part of
the government).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Yash Ghai, The Rule of Law, Legitimacy and Governance, 14 INT'L J.
Soc. L. 179, 179 (1986) (referring to the belief that any type of legitimacy claimed
would determine key features of that system's organization of authority and
administration).
126. See Protectors or Pretenders?, supra note 48 (observing that some nations
create NHRls only to appear concerned about human rights, and to lessen domestic
and international pressure).
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improve their reputations. 27 For this reason, states should promote
NHRIs based on their record in each country, upon evaluation of
their suitability, and whether they are the most effective method to
protect and promote human rights.121
The United Nations views NHRIs as useful contacts within their
respective countries on human rights matters. 2 9 It is important to
emphasize the uniqueness of this contact, as it is fundamentally
different from that with other pre-existing sources and manifestations
of states and their instrumentalities, including legislative, executive,
and judiciary branches.'30 NHRIs differ from NGOs because NHR~s
have a quasi-governmental status that makes their position
vulnerable to government pressure while also giving NHRIs the
potential to play a powerful role in promoting human rights policy."'
Thus, the United Nations advocated local initiatives in this area, as it
rightly understood that human rights could become a reality
throughout the world by the active and sustained role performed by
NHRIs' within states.13
2
NHRIs themselves, as well as the civil society, should constantly
assess NHRIs' performance and legitimacy.'33 NHRIs should
127. See id. at 1, 5 (questioning whether NHRIs established in "highly
repressive" states should be met with suspicion as to their commitment to
protecting human rights). Human Rights Watch further asserts that there are many
NHRIs set up in Africa that ignore the human rights abuses in their respective
states.
128. See id. at 4 (noting that there are a wide variety of human rights
commissions and it is unclear whether they are being evaluated to ascertain
whether they are successful).
129. See Paris Principles, supra note 26 (recognizing that the United Nations can
play an important role in aiding in the development of NHRIs by helping to
exchange information).
130. See id. (detailing the nature of the relationship between NHRIs and states
as being independent and working with other governmental bodies).
131. See id. (relating that states should establish NHRIs, and in turn NHRIs may
work with NGOs to further the human rights protection cause).
132. See Protectors or Pretenders?, supra note 48, at 4 (stating that the U.N.
High Commissioner is highly encouraging the creation and promotion of NHRIs).
133. See PERFORMANCE & LEGITIMACY: NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTIONs 57, 70 (International Council on Human Rights Policy 2000)
[hereinafter PERFORMANCE & LEGITIMACY] (examining how NHRIs in different
countries and contexts acquired a reputation for legitimacy and effectiveness).
2003]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
conduct their activities in a transparent manner because transparency
plays an important role in determining the overall effectiveness of
public institutions. 34 NHRIs must strengthen their powers so that
they can effectively protect and promote human rights, but
accountability must accompany the expansion of the NHRls'
powers. 35 By functioning in a transparent and effective manner, the
public can hold NHRIs accountable for their actions. 36 Moreover,
the -fact that NHRIs work to protect and promote human rights
suggest that their functions constantly ought to be in tune with
principles of accountability and transparency. NHRIs risk eroding
their reputations for legitimacy if the public's legitimate social
expectations go unfulfilled and if their recommendations remain
unenforced. 37  Operational transparency and institutional
accountability assure victims of human rights violations that NHRIs
work to provide justice to victims and preserve the rule of law.'38
This faith in NHRIs' institutional responsibility can help in the
preservation of the rule of law.
According to the International Council on Human Rights Policy's
report, an institution can maintain its formal accountability through
appointing its members, submitting its financial accounts, and
reporting its procedures.'39 NHRIs can also achieve accountability
for their effective performance through independent external audits
134. See Reif, supra note 15, at 18-19 (explaining that transparency improves
the accountability of institutions and the government).
135. See id. (noting that NHRIs can promote good governance by acting as a
mechanism for government accountability through initiating complaints that lead
to the investigation of human rights violations).
136. See id. at 27 (remarking that NHRIs can be more effective if they are held
accountable to the public through communication with the public and other
organizations).
137. See id. at 27-28 (asserting that a responsive government is profoundly
important to the effectiveness of NHRIs, because if the public has a negative view
of the NHRI's effectiveness, it will not use the institution).
138. See id. 23-28 (reviewing the factors, including transparency and
accountability, which strengthen the NHRIs' effectiveness).
139. See PERFORMANCE & LEGITIMACY, supra note 133, at 70 (stating that a
democratic body such as a legislature should be responsible for the formal
accountability of a NHIRI).
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that evaluate the impact of NHRIs.14 ° This could be in the form of an
audit report not just confined to evaluate financial and administrative
functions of the NHRIs, but also to evaluate the effectiveness of the
complaints redress mechanism of the NHRIs. 14' This would promote
efficiency and enhance the NHRIs' working quality, while also
helping to overcome the legal and bureaucratic hurdles associated
with government created institutions. Because NHRIs exist and
function on the basis of public trust, they need to constantly assess
themselves and evolve their activities to ensure that the protection
and promotion of human rights remains their primary objective. 142
The performance and accountability of NHRIs are inextricably
linked to the impact these institutions have in any society. People
should view the impact of NHRIs from the degree to which they
have fulfilled social expectations and their promises to enforce
human rights. 143 Without accountability, NHRIs would remain paper
tigers, thereby aggravating the frustration and disillusionment of
victims and society as a whole. 144 It is not in the best interests of the
preservation of the rule of law to allow any state to create and
encourage a dysfunctional institution in the name of human rights
protection. 145
IV. FUNCTIONS OF NHRIS - GOOD GOVERNANCE
AND MAINSTREAMING HUMAN RIGHTS
NHRIs perform a variety of functions, including investigating
alleged human rights violations, conducting public inquiries,
140. See id. at 70-71 (giving an example of the yearly external audit of the South
African Human Rights Commission's budget).
141. See id. at 71 (discussing how a regular audit, coupled with an account of
what the NHRI has done, increases effectiveness).
142. See id. at 70-71 (declaring that NHRIs must be responsive to public needs
and must be able to assess constantly the main human rights problems in the
society it serves).
143. See Reif, supra note 15, at 27-28 (emphasizing the importance of public
perception of NHRIs in their effectiveness).
144. See PERFORMANCE & LEGITIMACY, supra note 133, at 70 (explaining the
importance of accountability in NHRIs).
145. See id. at 59 (noting the importance of public legitimacy during the
establishment of a human rights institution).
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exercising advisory jurisdiction, enforcement of human rights in
prisons and other custodial institutions, providing advice and
assistance to governments, promoting human rights education and
awareness, promoting interaction, exchange, and better coordination
among other NHRIs in the region and worldwide, promoting
interaction and exchange with NGOs, and publication of annual
reports. 146 The section on competence and responsibility in the Paris
Principles provides some guidance as to the various functions that
NHRIs may perform.147 Cardenas made a useful distinction in regard
to the regulative 148 and constitutive 149 functions of NHRIs. Regulative
functions of NHRIs ensure conformity with international norms,
rules, and principles, while constitutive functions change the identity
of state or societal actors.5 0 Although this classification of NHRIs'
functions is useful, it is much more important to recognize that the
role and functions of NHRIs are to promote human rights as part of
institutionalizing good governance.' 5' The concept of good
governance 5 2 is broad and has been influenced significantly by the
146. See C. Raj Kumar, Role and Contribution of National Human Rights
Commissions in Protecting National and International Human Rights Norms in the
National Context, 47 INDIAN J. PUB. ADMIN. 222, 225 (2001) (outlining the
functions and role of NHRIs).
147. See Fact Sheet, supra note 20, Annex (listing the responsibilities of
national institutions).
148. See Cardenas, supra note 22, at 26 (observing that the regulative functions
of NHRIs are government compliance, relations with the judiciary, and
independent activities).
149. See id. (noting that the constitutive functions of NHRIs are domestic
socialization and international cooperation).
150. See id. at 25 (defining regulative and constitutive functions).
151. See James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency
Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in International Law,
5 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 107, 147-55 (1999) (explaining that international
human rights principles will play only a marginal role in the World Bank's good
governance agenda unless those principles are functionally defined).
152. See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Re-Conceiving "Third World" Legitimate
Governance Struggles in our Time: Emergent Imperatives for Rights Activism, 6
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2000) (setting forth three basic characteristics of
governance; local governance, the relative location of governance, and strategies of
movements for legitimate governance in third world states); see also Ngaire
Woods, Good Governance in International Organizations, 5 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 39, 39 (1999) (commenting that after the Cold War, many
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principles of human rights, development, and democratization. 53
Arguably, in a global governance 54 system, NHRIs demonstrate a
method of democratic decentralization that develops, protects, and
enforces human rights at the local level.'55 At the same time, human
rights norms are also formulated, developed, and institutionalized at
the international level.
The United Nations Development Programme ("UNDP") views
governance as "the exercise of economic, political and administrative
authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises
mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and
groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their
obligations and mediate their differences."' 5 6  Governance
encompasses the shape that civil and political societies will take in
the process of economic, social, and political development. NHRIs
should play a central role in developing good governance policies in
states. Reif explains the role of NHRIs, perceiving good governance,
as "the responsible use of public authority to manage nation's
affairs."' 57 According to Reif, good governance includes numerous
practices such as:
international organizations heeded the call from countries to promote democracy
and better government); Sakiko Fakuda-Parr & Richard Ponzio, Governance: Past,
Present, Future - Setting the Governance Agenda for the Millennium Declaration,
U.N. Development Programme Paper, at 1 (2002) (referring to the U.N.
Millennium Declaration's vision of good governance as a key objective for the
twenty-first century). See generally RICHARD FALK, ON HUMANE GOVERNANCE:
TOWARD A NEW GLOBAL POLITICS 6-8 (1995) (discussing the institutionalization
of humane governance versus world government).
153. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 47 (stating that democratic entitlement requires democracy
to validate governance).
154. See John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, I CHI.
J. INT'L L. 205, 206 (2000) (maintaining that global governance has a narrower
scope than the more frequently used term 'globalization').
155. See generally Thomas G. Weiss, Governance, Good Governance and
Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges, 21 THIRD WORLD Q. 795,
801-06 (2000) (examining the emergence of governance and the United Nation's
role in the conceptual process).
156. See Fakuda-Parr & Ponzio, supra note 152 (defining various international
organizations' definitions of governance).
157. See, Reif, supra note 15, at 16 (quoting CLARENCE J. DIAS & DAVID
GILLIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 10 (1993)).
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[A] professional civil service, elimination of corruption in government, a
predictable, transparent and accountable administration, democratic
decision-making, the supremacy of the rule of law, effective protection of
human rights, an independent judiciary, a fair economic system,
appropriate devolution and decentralization of government, appropriate
levels of military spending, and so on.
158
An expansive understanding of good governance helps to recognize
the mandate of NHRIs and how they should function.5 9 The
effectiveness of NHRIs depends upon numerous factors, including
the mode and method of establishment, mandate, level of
independence, availability of financial and human resources, scope
of powers and integrity of NHRIs' members. 6 °
The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific ("UNESCAP") observed that eight major
158. See Reif, supra note 15, at 16-17 (noting the many ways in which people
understand good governance). See generally Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a
Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective Human Rights: Elevating
Official Corruption to a Crime under International Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 149, 152
(2000) (maintaining that in countries where transparency and accountability are
lacking, corruption flourishes); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy
and Human Rights: The Dialectic of the Relationship, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 495,
495-96 (1999) (examining the relationship between corruption, legitimacy, and
human rights and how it restructures political action); NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA,
CORRUPTION - A VIOLATOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Transparency Int'l Working
Paper, June 1998) (discussing the different ways that a country's corruption
violates the protection and promotion of human rights), available at
http://www.transparency. org/working-papers/jayawickrama/jayawickrama. html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2003); LAWRENCE COCKSROFT, CORRUPTION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A CRUCIAL LINK (Transparency Int'l Working Paper, October 1998)
(maintaining that the elimination of corruption and strengthening of human rights
are interdependent), available at
http:://www. transparency.org/working__papers/cockcroft/cockroft.html (last visited
Oct. 15, 2003); C. Raj Kumar, The Benefit of a Corruption-Free Society, H.K.
LAW., Dec. 2002, at 39 (arguing that an imminent need exists to formulate a
fundamental human right to corruption-free government).
159. See generally Fakuda-Par & Ponzio, supra note 152 (providing a general
understanding of good governance).
160. See Kamal Hossain, Human Rights and Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSIONS AND OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: NATIONAL EXPERIENCES THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD 55, 61-62 (Kamal Hossain et al. eds., 2000) (reciting the features to
examine when measuring the effectiveness of NHRIs).
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characteristics constitute good governance:16" ' participation, rule of
law, transparency,' 6 2 responsiveness, consensus-oriented, equity and
inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability.'63 The
functions of the NHRIs discussed earlier do not fully reflect this
approach. Thus, in order to promote a good governance agenda for
human rights, NHRIs should alter their present structure to include a
more participative, accountable, and transparent approach.' 6
Because a NHRI, in its functioning and in its dealing with the
government, would stress the fulfillment of these principles, it is
important that its own conduct be in conformity with the good
governance agenda. 65 Linking human rights and good governance
promotes greater transparency and accountability, which may
provide more effective communication and engagement between
NHRIs, governments, civil society, and victims of human rights
violations. 166 In reality, the only way to achieve promotion of human
rights is by building national capacities through the expansion of
NHRIs' functions to include the governance approach.167
One could establish such expansion by mainstreaming human
rights, which refers to "the concept of enhancing the human rights
161. See U.N. Economic & Social Commission for Asia & the Pacific, What is
Good Governance? (spelling out detailed definitions of each characteristic),
available at http://unescap.org/huset/gg/governance.htm (last visited Oct 15,
2003).
162. See Saladin A]-Jurf, Good Governance and Transparency: Their Impact on
Development, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 193 (1999) (supporting
UNESCAP's opinion that governments cannot engage in good governance without
promoting transparency).
163. See id. (explaining generally how to implement good governance through
transparency and accountability).
164. See Philip Alston, Towards a Human Rights Accountability Index, 1 HuM.
DEV. J. 249, 250 (2000) (asserting that a composite index could help achieve good
governance).
165. See Reif, supra note 15, at 18-19 (explaining how NHRIs should build
good governance by being participatory, transparent, and accountable).
166. See id. (indicating that NHRI's accountability establishes lines of
communication with the public).
167. See Mary Robinson, From Rhetoric to Reality: Making Human Rights
Work, E.H.R.L.R. 2003, 1, 6-7 (defining national capacities as national protection
systems that encompass entire institutional arrangements functioning under
national law to ensure human rights).
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programme and integrating it with a broad range of United Nations
activities,"'68 including development, governance, and administration
of the states. In 1997, the U.N. Secretary General designated human
rights as a crosscutting issue in his reform program. 169 Even though
the United Nations has used mainstreaming in the context of
integrating all U.N. activities within the human rights framework,
this concept is extremely relevant for reorienting the functions of
NHRIs.171 For example, NHRIs can play an active role if they shape
the governance approaches that states adopt to include human rights
in all its activities. By including human rights, NHRIs have the
potential to ensure that states no longer see human rights as negative
obligations, but as positive duties.'71 Thus, mainstreaming human
rights would help in promoting rights-based approaches to
development, and the NHRIs could be key institutions in initiating
such a process of development. The UNDP's Human Development
Report for 2000 suggested that NHRIs should go beyond
conventional assessment methods in their annual reports that take
into account only civil and political rights ("CPRs"). 172 NHRIs
should also take a pro-active role by inquiring into violations of
economic, social, and cultural rights ("ESC rights").173 In 1998, the
168. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mainstreaming
Human Rights (describing the concept of mainstreaming human rights), available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/development/mainstreaming-Ol.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2003).
169. See id. (referring to how the Secretary General wished to enhance the
human rights program and better blend it into the range of U.N. activities).
170. See generally id. (stating that the United Nations' mainstreaming of human
rights serves as a vehicle for a new operationalization for development).
171. See Robinson, supra note 167, at 4-6 (describing how linking human rights
with democracy advances human development).
172. See Human Development Report 2000, U.N. Development Programme, at
113 (emphasizing the importance of independent national assessments to advance
all human rights).
173. See MATTHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS
DEVELOPMENT 8-16 (Ian Brownlie, ed., Clarendon Press 1995) (noting that
violations of CPRs often take priority over ESC rights); see also Scott Leckie,
Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 81, 82 (1998) (maintaining that states have not given
responses to violations of economic, social, and cultural rights the same serious
consideration as violations of political and civil rights); ASBJORN EIDE & ALLAN
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United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("CESCR") adopted a General Comment'74 that dealt with NHRIs'
roles in the protection of ESC rights.'75 The CESCR observed that
the General Comment requires each state party "take steps ... with a
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the [Covenant]
rights.., by all appropriate means."' 76 One way to realize these
rights is through NHRIs' work to protect and promote human rights,
while exercising their functions to ensure the indivisibility and
interdependence of all human rights.' Although NHRIs may not
have explicit powers to address ESC rights, they should attempt to
pursue an integrated approach relating to the fulfillment of human
rights.78
V. NHRIS TAKING COGNIZANCE OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
States no longer neglect economic and social rights as they did in
the past in relation to civil and political rights. 7 9 States have begun
ROSAS, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge, in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 1, 17 (Asbjorn Eide et.
al. eds., Kluwer Acad. Publishers 1995) (observing that some critics do not
consider ESC rights as true rights at all).
174. See General Comment 10, The Role of National Human Rights Institutions
in the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 19th
Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 1, U.N. Doc.E/C.12/1998/25 (1998) (stating that national
institutions can take important steps in promoting and protecting human rights).
175. See University of Minnesota Human Rights Resource Centre, Module 23:
National Human Rights Commissions and ESC Rights (explaining the
characteristics of human rights commissions and the activities they could perform
that would further ESC rights), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/modules/module23.htm (last
visited Oct. 15, 2003).
176. General Comment 10, supra note 174, art. 1, para.l.
177. See id. (commenting on the role of NHRIs in the protection of economic,
social, and cultural rights).
178. See Audrey R. Chapman, A "Violations Approach" for Monitoring the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. Q.
23, 30 (1996) (concluding that the absence of national institutions committed to the
promotion of ESC rights presents challenges to protecting those rights).
179. See Audrey R. Chapman & Sage Russell, Introduction, CORE
OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS 3, 3-19 (Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell eds., Intersentia, Antwerp,
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to appreciate the need for developing consensus on the core elements
of these rights, formulation and development of international
standards, and constituting monitoring mechanisms. 8 ° The CESCR
has engaged in the adoption of general comments' on particular
rights in the ICESCR,12 including the rights to food and health and
two general comments on education.8 3 The U.N. Commission on
Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights' further accentuated the importance of
ESC rights by appointing Special Rapporteurs to investigate and
report on the implementation and violation of certain ESC rights
around the world.14 These U.N. bodies have approved certain
resolutions on matters relating to these rights in order to strengthen
the implementation framework of ESC rights.8 5 The 1986 Limburg
Principles on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural
2002) (noting that recent initiatives, such as the Maastricht Guidelines, are
encouraging states to focus on protecting economic and social rights).
180. See id. (explaining the necessary steps for establishing ESC rights
implementation and monitoring).
181. See, e.g., General Comment No. 11: Plans of Action for Primary
Education, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess. at Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1999/4
(1999) (describing the importance of global primary education); General Comment
No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, U.N. ESCOR, 20th Sess. at Agenda Item 7,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999) (outlining the United Nations' position on the
responsibilities of states to ensure availability of and accessibility to food);
General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., U.N.
Doc. E/C12/1999/10 (1999) (highlighting the U.N. belief that education is a
fundamental and indispensable right for all people, especially those who are
socially and economically marginalized); General Comment No. 14: The Right to
the Highest Attainable Standards of Health, U.N. ESCOR, 22d Sess., at Agenda
Item 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) (describing health as a fundamental
human right).
182. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
supra note 8, pbml. (outlining the economic, social, and cultural rights that all
people possess).
183. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (describing the United Nations'
position on and plans of action for specific ESC rights regarding education and
health).
184. See U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Special
Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights (referring to various reports on
human rights issues, including ESC rights, by appointed representatives), available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/tm.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
185. See Chapman, supra note 178, at 42 (describing principles that detail a
state's obligations to comply with the ICESCR).
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Rights'86 and the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 8 7 are useful documents that
provide guidance to states for the implementation of ESC rights.
Both sets of guidelines, developed by groups of international
academic and human rights experts, have achieved prominence in the
international arena and have received de facto status within the
CESCR as evidenced by their incorporation into the general
comments. 8 ' These developments have undoubtedly paved the way
for the development of a framework for recognizing certain core
elements of ESC rights, for setting standards, and more importantly,
for identifying minimum state obligations. 8 9  NHRIs have
traditionally focused on the protection of CPRs, while there has been
little effort, if any, on the part of NHRls to understand the impact of
ESC rights violations.1 90
NHRIs need to ensure that they familiarize themselves with the
legal framework of ESC rights.'9 ' This would help them develop
procedures and institutional mechanisms to engage with
governments on matters relating to violations of ESC rights. 92
NHRIs need to understand that there is a veritable relationship
186. See The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 122, 131-34
(1987) [hereinafter The Limburg Principles] (detailing the procedures and
consultations states should implement to effectively comply with the goals of the
ICESCR).
187. See THE MAASTRICHT GUIDELINES ON VIOLATIONS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 1 (Theo C. van Boven et al. eds., Utrecht, Netherlands
Institute of Human Rights 1998) [hereinafter THE MAASTRICHT GUIDELINES]
(commemorating the tenth anniversary of ICESER and expanding on the principles
set forth in the Limburg Principles).
188. See Chapman, supra note 178, at 43 (interpreting the Limburg Principles as
obligations for states under the ICESER).
189. See id. (calling for the implementation of a "violations" approach for
monitoring international ESC rights).
190. See id. at 26 (discussing a discrepancy in states' approaches to CPRs and
ESC rights).
191. See THE MAASTRICHT GUIDELINES, supra note 187, at 5 (describing
application of legal norms as contributing to development of minimum standards
and scope for ESC rights).
192. See id. (suggesting that a legal approach helps states fulfill their legal
obligation to take immediate steps towards full realization of ESC rights).
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between the protection and promotion of CPRs and the enforcement
of ESC rights. 93 The role of NHRIs should be to narrow the
differences between these two sets of rights so that public policy
goals of economic and social development become assertive and
enforceable rights for the empowerment of citizens.1 94 NHRls formed
under specific political circumstances relating to massive violations
of CPRs can pursue the integral development of CPRs and ESC
rights. 95 This development would reflect the inherent evolutionary
nature of human rights discourse, and thus NHRIs should not hesitate
to expand their mandates to include ESC rights. 96 Although there
may be legislative and administrative bottlenecks in NHRls
assuming such a role, it is the responsibility of these institutions to
engage governments in order to compel them to legislate on matters
relating to ESC rights and to empower NHRIs with the jurisdictional
mandate to inquire into violations of such rights.' 9' NHRIs can
handle any opposition from states by mobilizing civil society and
other actors in the governance framework so that governments do not.
neglect their commitments to the protection and promotion of ESC
rights.' "98 Moreover, since NHRIs are domestic in their origin and
development, 99 they are in a better position to formulate the core
193. See Chapman, supra note 178, at 23 (maintaining that there is an
interrelation between CPRs and ESC rights).
194. See id. at 29-30 (describing the discrepancy between conceptual
development of CPRs and ESC rights and calling for greater understanding of ESC
rights in order to effectively implement and monitor them).
195. See Dianne Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations
System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society, 18 HuM. RTS. Q. 107,
111-12 (1996) (discussing the need for NGOs to be flexible and open-ended).
196. See id. at 110 (noting international relations developments as a driving
element in the change of the shapes and purposes of NGOs).
197. See id. at 127-28 (relating the power of NGOs to express a third viewpoint,
separate from governments and markets); see also The Limburg Principles, supra
note 186, at 135 (explaining the responsibilities of states to utilize international and
non-governmental organizations in implementing the ICESCR).
198. See id. at 124, 132 (suggesting that states use all elements of governance to
implement the ICESCR and make reports on ICESCR implementation a part of
broad public discussion on policies and goals).
199. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and
International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 185-86 (1997) (noting
different definitions and conceptions of NGOs); see also Martin A. Olz, Non-
Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights Systems, 28 COLUM.
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minimum obligations necessary for the protection and promotion of
ESC rights.200 The success of this role for NHRIs, however, will
depend upon whether these institutions have a certain degree of
independence and autonomy in their functioning, including the
powers necessary to perform required duties in an effective and
efficient manner. z1
VI. NHRIS AND THE JUDICIARY - PERFORMING
SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONS
The role of the judiciary 22 in the protection and promotion of
human rights has developed significantly over the last several
decades. Judiciaries of different jurisdictions have developed
constitutional law to ensure the protection of rights and the
preservation of the rule of law. 0 3 Independence of the judiciary has
become an-accepted norm relating to the governance framework in
most jurisdictions.2°4 Constitutionalization of human rights and the
interpretation of these rights by the judiciary have helped the
development of jurisprudence relating to human rights within the
domestic context.0 5 In particular, judicial systems in developed
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 307, 320 (1997) (describing how some human rights advocates
include groups established in a single country and rely solely on domestic law in
the definition of"NGO").
200. See Olz, supra note 199, at 329-30 (discussing the role of NGOs and
NHRIs and absence of limitations that states face in terms of sovereignty and non-
intervention in international matters for NGOs and NIHRIs).
201. See Otto, supra note 195, at 135-39 (relating the "Grotian" formulation of
NGO participation in the international community as requiring an expansive and
emancipatory role for NGOs).
202. See generally THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, CIMEL BOOK SERIES No. 5 (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif eds.,
1997) (reviewing the judiciary's role in promoting and protecting human rights).
203. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1359 (1997) (arguing that the obligation
to obey the law arises from the judiciary's authoritative interpretation of
constitutional law).
204. See generally McCrudden, supra note 34, at 502 (describing the interaction
between judiciaries in various jurisdictions and noting the independence of the
judiciary in the field of human rights).
205. See id. at 500 (observing developments in human rights protection in
national legal systems via primarily legal, i.e. judicial, means).
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countries have begun to play an important role in terms of human
rights by ensuring respect for law and requiring that governance
structures and administrative machinery function efficiently.2 6 With
the advent of NHRIs with a specific focus on human rights, scholars
have raised a question as to whether the judiciary's role in the
protection and promotion of human rights is in any way diluted.0 7
The fact that NHRIs are exclusively designed human rights
institutions should not affect, nullify, or even alter the role played by
national judicial institutions.0 8 One could better understand the role
of NHRIs if one recognizes that they are most effective when other
social control mechanisms are operating in an efficient manner. 20 9 A
state should not compromise the institutional legitimacy and legal
foundation of its judicial institution to provide space for the work of
NHRIs.21 ° In fact, one of the reasons why NHRIs work for human
rights protection and promotion within the governance framework is
that the judiciary is concerned with all disputes in society and may
not have sufficient time and resources to focus exclusively on human
rights issues. This is not to suggest, however, that the judiciary
should in any way neglect or marginalize issues relating to human
rights.21'
206. See, e.g., Christina Murray, A Constitutional Beginning: Making South
Africa's Final Constitution, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 809, 837 (2001)
(relating how the South African Constitutional Court played an integral role in
certifying the new Constitution and setting forth the new rule of law).
207. See generally Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Judicial Review, Legislative Override,
And Democracy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 470 (2003) (discussing whether
judicial enforcement of rights actually detracts from the real enforcement of those
rights).
208. See Olz, supra note 199, at 321 (claiming that the state - and by extension,
the state courts - is at the center of the traditional international legal order).
209. See The Limburg Principles, supra note 186, at 124 (asserting that the
government should work with national organizations and NGOs because they can
thus play an important role in protecting rights); see also THE MAASTRICHT
GUIDELINES, supra note 187, at 9 (highlighting the importance of state
participation in national organizations to protect ESC and human rights).
210. See Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role
for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 652-60 (2003) (arguing that courts
have a vital role in the protection of human rights that cannot be ceded).
211. See id. (emphasizing the importance of courts in human rights protection
and enforcement).
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Human rights have been, and will be, an important issue for the
judiciaries of the world, as states have most often recognized these
rights by their constitutions or because a particular state may have
been a party to an international convention resulting in certain treaty
obligations under international law or international human rights
law.21 2 It is the responsibility of the judiciary to determine the scope
of the legal obligation 213 of the particular state under the international
human rights law.214 The judiciary will also be responsible for
determining the scope of the provisions of their country's
constitution, particularly relating to human rights.1 5  Judicial
institutions will supplement the role of NHRIs by providing them
with important legal and constitutional frameworks for the protection
and promotion of human rights.21 6 Moreover, NHRIs generally tend
to have a broader mandate when it comes to their jurisdictional
operation. Hence, they are in a better position to take cognizance of
human rights violations than the judiciary, which will feel restrained
based on certain laws, rules, and regulations as to how and when
issues come before the court.217 The rules relating to standing may
also hinder courts generally from taking cognizance of human rights
violations, even though certain courts have created progressive
212. See id. at 644 (defining human rights as those articulated in legal texts such
as constitutions, judicial decisions and treaties).
213. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of
Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 354-55
(1998) (analyzing the extent of compliance with obligations of international human
rights law); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2602-03 (1997) (stating the principles of compliance
under international law).
214. See Perry, supra note 210, at 639-45 (explaining the judiciary's role in
protecting human rights).
215. See id. at 643-44 (noting that courts are independent and separate from the
government or politics when deciding human rights cases, and that they are only
beholden to the constitutions of their particular states).
216. See id. at 644 (specifically referencing South Africa's constitution, which
provides that a court is subject only "to the Constitution and the law" when
deciding human rights cases).
217. See Olz, supra note 199, at 342-43 (noting national organizations'
contributions to human rights issues, particularly in the fields of standard-setting,
co-management, and public awareness); see also Chamovitz, supra note 199, at
274 (describing the benefits of national organizations' involvement in international
issues, including human rights).
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systems to overcome the limitations of rules relating to locus
standi.21 8 But NHRIs have no such limitations, and as long as they
perceive a particular issue to be of relevance for human rights, they
can take cognizance of the matter. 19 However, we should not ignore
the supplemental role played by the national judiciaries to the work
of NHRIs. Since national judiciaries are designed with an
enforcement mechanism, they can assist NHRIs in ensuring that
human rights are enforced.22 0 Enforcement of human rights is one
vital issue in which there could be greater interaction between
national judiciaries and NHRIs.221 It is possible that NHRIs can
approach courts of law on matters relating to non-enforcement of
human rights by the particular government in order to seek
appropriate direction.222
VII. IMPACT OF CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE
FUNCTIONING OF NHRIS
Civil society223 has started to play an important role in the human
rights movement.224 NGOs have altered the state-centered approach
218. See Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 405, 453-61 (1997) (generally observing the role of U.S.
federal law in global civil society, including issues of standing and questions of the
applicability of U.S. federal law to issues international in nature).
219. See Charnovitz, supra note 199, at 245 (arguing that NGOs possess the
ability to operate outside of traditional governmental and bureaucratic channels).
220. See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial
Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT 455, 473-78 (2000) (reviewing the
purpose of the judiciary and its enforcement function); Alexander & Schauer,
supra note 203, at 1367 (remarking on the function of the judiciary).
221. See Collingsworth, supra note 33, at 188-90 (conveying an understanding
of the problem of human rights enforcement).
222. See, e.g., Sripati, supra note 58, at 15 (illustrating that the Indian National
Human Rights Commission has the power to approach courts under certain
circumstances to enforce human rights).
223. See generally Mary H. Kaldor, The Ideas of 1989: The Origins of the
Concept of Global Civil Society, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 475, 475-
88 (1999) (discussing the concept of "global civil society").
224. See Otto, supra note 195, at 125-29 (evaluating the roles envisioned for
international civil society).
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of human rights protection 225 and brought a renewed sense of
enthusiasm to promote human rights activism. Civil society actors
have unique characteristics that make them independent and
autonomous of any limitations that would otherwise restrict the work
of other democratic institutions in any society.226 An empowered
civil society can duly protect human rights and take efforts to redress
victimization, on account of human rights violations.27 The
engagement and interaction between civil society and NHRIs are
extremely important, as civil society can assess the work of the
NHRIs in fulfilling its mandate.228 Moreover, NHRIs in most states
may not have the resources to obtain all the information relating to
human rights violations and, hence, could draw from the experience
of civil society actors.2 29 NHRIs should develop internal mechanisms
that involve civil society to ensure that human rights do not remain
an official or quasi-official discourse but rather become a
democratized debate involving all sections of the society.23 ° Only
when NHRIs are able to work with civil society actors in ensuring
the protection and promotion of human rights can we truly achieve
this democratization of the human rights discourse. 3 It is possible
that the roles and functions of NHRIs and civil society actors could
come in conflict, particularly with regard to approach of dissent
when it comes to the policies of the government and its implications
225. See Charnovitz, supra note 199, at 185 (noting the historical and present
role of NGOs in human rights protection).
226. See Christenson, supra note 218, at 412-17 (discussing the impact of the
civil society on international law).
227. See id. at 412-13 (remarking that civil society organizations have the power
to shape public action).
228. See Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice:
Human Rights and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1335, 1339 (1999) (describing the ability of transnational civil society to
demand and oversee state accountability).
229. See id. at 1339-41 (declaring the ability of civil society to promote human
rights norms and raise concerns about marginalized people and their rights).
230. See id. at 1340 (maintaining that a robust civil society can promote
democratic governance).
231. See id. (stating that a civil society creates a setting in which human rights
advocates can work through the application of human rights norms).
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for human rights. 2 Even under these circumstances, it is important
for both civil society actors and NHRIs to understand that both
institutions are performing different functions and legitimate
disagreements on issues relating to human rights may occur in
democratic societies and ought to be solved within the framework of
the democratic discourse. 233 The civil society can actually empower
the NHRIs by bringing into focus the human rights issues that affect
the governance in a particular society.234 Moreover, human rights
issues are diverse in nature and the input of civil society would be
valuable when it comes to evolving expertise on particular issues
relating to human rights that affect a specific community.235
Legislatures must guarantee the engagement of civil society with
NHRls so that participation of civil society does not depend upon the
decision of the members of NHRIs.236 This would help in the
development of institutional cultures that respect human rights, as
there is a lot to learn from the experience of civil society actors and
NHRIs in their different approaches to the protection and promotion
of human rights.
CONCLUSION
NHRIs are useful institutions and can make an immense
contribution to the protection and promotion of human rights. 37
However, at present, NHRIs suffer from not only structural problems
and functional deficiencies, but they also lack adequate mechanisms
232. See Olz, supra note 199, 326-31 (detailing how national institutions can
interact with NGOs to promote and influence international human rights in their
particular states).
233. See Mertus, supra note 228, at 1371-72 (describing conflicts between
NGOs and notions of democracy and civil society).
234. See id. at 1338-40 (explaining the importance of civil society to strengthen
and promote human rights).
235. See id. (asserting that civil society has the ability to look to the community
and promote human rights and "raise the concerns of unheard voices").
236. See id. at 1374-75 (stressing the need for NGOs to be seen as legitimate
and regulated by international law).
237. See Chapman, supra note 178, at 27-29 (describing the importance of
NHRls and their ability to effect progress in the development of human rights).
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for enforcement of human rights.238 Mere institutionalization of
human rights is not sufficient, unless it helps transform the
governance agenda. One should not confuse NHRIs with the courts
and other quasi-judicial institutions or other government bodies.239
The idea underlying the establishment of NHRIs is to ensure that
they remain vigilant over those who hold and exercise powers so that
their conduct conform to national and international human rights
norms. The work of NHRIs, therefore, must constantly evolve and
should focus on all those activities that result in the violation of
human dignity. If NHRIs understand their proper role and are
allowed to function freely, bearing in mind the objectives for which
they were established, they would be able to fulfill social
expectations and hold promises for victims of human rights
violations and society.240
At the same time, NHRIs should not compete for the democratic
space that has been hitherto within the province of legislature,
executive, and judiciary.2 41 Since human rights discourse is not only
a public policy discourse, but rather a social and political
empowerment discourse, we should guarantee NHRIs democratic
space to continue their independent functions in fulfilling the
mandate to protect and promote human rights. The rationale for such
separate space is to elevate the discussion of human rights and rights
relating to development from policy guidelines to central political
principles of any democratic society.2 42 NHRIs must become
independent democratic institutions with the institutional capacity to
interlink issues relating to human rights, development, and
238. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (explaining the structural
weaknesses of NHRIs).
239. See supra notes 208-212 and accompanying text (drawing a distinction
between judiciary functions and NHRI functions in the context of human rights).
240. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
social expectations on NHRIs' functions).
241. See supra notes 203-209, 213-216 and accompanying text (explaining that
the judiciary has its own role in preserving human rights that can be supplemental
to that of NHRIs).
242. See supra notes 216-222 (implying that by working with judiciaries and the
civil society, NHRIs can emphasize the importance of preserving human rights
within a state and bring human rights to the forefront of the political arena).
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governance with a view to meet the social expectations they have
generated.243
243. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (relating the importance of
NHRI independence).
